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Abstract
Deep learning (DL) techniques have revolutionised artificial systems’ performance 
on myriad tasks, from playing Go to medical diagnosis. Recent developments have 
extended such successes to natural language processing, an area once deemed 
beyond such systems’ reach. Despite their different goals (technological develop-
ment vs. theoretical insight), these successes have suggested that such systems may 
be pertinent to theoretical linguistics. The competence/performance distinction pre-
sents a fundamental barrier to such inferences. While DL systems are trained on 
linguistic performance, linguistic theories are aimed at competence. Such a barrier 
has traditionally been sidestepped by assuming a fairly close correspondence: per-
formance as competence plus noise. I argue this assumption is unmotivated. Compe-
tence and performance can differ arbitrarily. Thus, we should not expect DL models 
to illuminate linguistic theory.
Keywords Philosophy of linguistics · Philosophy of artificial intelligence · Machine 
learning · Competence and performance
1 Introduction
Over the last 15 years or so, deep learning approaches have become dominant in 
computer science. For a wide variety of tasks, if we want a computer to do some-
thing for us—identify objects in photos, diagnose diseases, drive cars, etc.—we are 
better off providing the computer with a large set of exemplary data, and allowing 
it to learn how to complete the task for itself, rather than programming a solution 
ourselves. This is as true in the case of linguistic tasks, such as translation, inscrib-
ing speech, filtering ‘spam’, and others, as it is in any other domain, if not more so. 
Reasonably enough, these successes have led various theorists to ask whether these 
applied, computational models might provide insight to theoretical linguistics, the 
 * Gabe Dupre 
 G.g.dupre@keele.ac.uk
1 Keele University, Newcastle, UK
 G. Dupre 
1 3
discipline aimed at describing and explaining the properties of human natural lan-
guage. In this paper, I shall argue that, for the core tasks of theoretical linguistics, 
there are principled reasons why this is unlikely to be the case. Specifically, deep 
learning systems are unlikely to prove illuminating to theoretical linguistics, on the 
grounds that linguistic theories are guided not solely by normal linguistic behaviour, 
but by the constraints of adjacent disciplines, such as neuroscience, evolutionary 
theory, developmental psychology, etc. and thus the rules and structures they posit 
are, from the perspective of observable speech, sui generis and quirky, and thus that 
deep learning systems trained on such observable speech behaviour are unlikely to 
capture them.
2  Different Targets, Shared Paths?
I shall use the term ‘Natural Language Processing’ or ‘NLP’ to refer to the applied 
scientific project of designing a computational system capable of performing lin-
guistic tasks. Paradigmatic such tasks include translation from one language to 
another, transcription of speech, conversation (by so-called ‘chatbots’), classify-
ing written texts as hate speech or spam, etc. Clearly, automated systems with such 
capacities can be both useful and valuable, which motivates massive investment in 
the development and improvement of such systems. Nowadays, the most common, 
and most successful, approach to the creation of such systems is Deep Learning 
(‘DL’), wherein the computational system ‘learns’ for itself how to perform on the 
basis of, typically very, large sets of data.1 Assessment of such tasks is pragmatic, 
typically involving broadly behavioural measures, such as accuracy of translation (as 
compared to that of a skilled human translator). The central question for NLP is: do 
these systems do what we want them to?
I shall use the term ‘Theoretical Linguistics’ or ‘TL’ to refer to the basic scien-
tific project of describing and explaining the properties of human language. Theo-
retical linguistics is itself further broken up into various sub-disciplines, focusing 
on different aspects of human language: centrally, phonology, morphology, syntax, 
and semantics. For the purposes of this paper, I shall assume that TL is a branch of 
cognitive psychology, and thus that a true theory of human language will thereby 
provide an account of the distinctive features of human psychology that enable us 
to learn and use language.2 For example, a true phonological theory will provide an 
1 Of course, the degree to which these systems are constrained by the goals, structures, etc. provided by 
the programmer varies, and should not be undersold.
2 While this ‘mentalist’ position is very widespread within linguistics, there are alternatives. Famously, 
Katz (1984, 1980) argued that linguistics should be construed as a branch of mathematics (‘Platonism’), 
and Devitt (2006) has argued that linguistics should be understood as concerning properties of concrete 
public symbol types (‘nominalism’). Within linguistics, Gazdar et  al. (1985) are explicit that they do 
not view the success of their theory as dependent on whether it accurately describes human psychology 
(p. 5), although whether they endorse a Platonist or nominalist approach is left unclear. I will simply be 
assuming mentalism for the purposes of this paper, and thus my arguments will be relevant only to the 
question of what we can learn from DL about natural language understood as a psychological capacity.
1 3
(What) Can Deep Learning Contribute to Theoretical…
abstract description of the ways that speakers represent the sounds of their language, 
identifying the ways they group and differentiate speech sounds (as similar/differ-
ent, legitimate/illegitimate, etc.). Such descriptions will be needed both in the cross-
linguistic case in the description of putative linguistic ‘universals’ (e.g. that all lan-
guages that allow sonority decreases, such as ‘lb’ in their syllabic onsets, also allow 
sonority increases, such as ‘bl’, but not vice versa), and in the description of spe-
cific languages (e.g. that English prohibits sonority decreases in onsets). Likewise 
for other branches of linguistics. Importantly, while the evidence for or against such 
claims will typically come from observations about language use, paradigmatically 
including native speaker judgements of the (un-)acceptability of certain expressions, 
it may also come from myriad other domains, such as psychological or neurobio-
logical theory, evolutionary and human history, cross-linguistic comparisons, learn-
ability considerations, etc. Assessment of such work consists in the application of 
standard ‘theoretical virtues’: simplicity, empirical coverage, consilience, etc. The 
question for TL is: does a given theory accurately describe human psychology?
Despite my insistence that TL can be informed by such neighboring disciplines as 
neurobiology and developmental psychology, it is important to distinguish the goals 
of these different disciplines. Firstly, as I will use the term, TL is a synchronic dis-
cipline. That is, the goal of TL is to describe the acquired states of linguistic com-
petence in normal humans. This differentiates TL from developmental linguistics, 
which aims to describe the psychological mechanisms involved in acquiring such 
a steady state, as well as the trajectories involved in such acquisition. Secondly, TL 
is a computational level discipline, in the sense of Marr (1982). That is, it aims to 
describe such steady states of linguistic competence at a relatively abstract level, in 
terms of the cognitive tasks such states are deployed to solve and the information 
appealed to in such cognitive activities. This differentiates TL from psycholinguis-
tics and neurolinguistics, which are aimed at lower-level descriptions of the algorith-
mic processes used in executing such computations, and the neurobiological mecha-
nisms which realize or instantiate such algorithmic processing.
These distinctions are important as they provide a restriction on the scope of my 
argument: investigation of DL models is unlikely to provide insight into TL, viewed 
as a synchronic and computational level discipline. My argument is thus consistent 
with recent work, e.g. Pater (2019) and Linzen (2019), that has argued that DL may 
provide insight into the mechanisms by which linguistic competence is acquired. 
Linzen argues that while we are unlikely to be able to read off human competence 
from language-trained machines (as “there are significant differences between the 
syntactic representations that RNNs acquire and those of humans.” (p. 105)), once 
the structure of human competence is identified as a target, it is possible that DL 
systems can be used to model language acquisition on the basis of linguistic data. 
Likewise, it is possible that DL-style systems could provide insight into how linguis-
tic competence is realized, without such systems being suitable tools for discovering 
the computational-level properties of human language.3
3 As an epistemological pluralist, I am also open to the idea that DL models may indirectly constrain TL 
theorizing, by showing that some proposed linguistic competences are more plausibly learned or neuro-
biologically realized than others. The argument in the paper is aimed at a potential direct inference from 
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Given the quite different goals of DL and TL, there is no requirement that the 
results of either project will be relevant to the other. This mutual independence is 
a common-enough feature of applied and basic science. Aeronautical engineering 
need not inform, nor be informed by, the biological study of animal flight. However, 
in practice, especially in cognitive domains, applied and basic scientific disciplines 
often display high degrees of productive ‘cross-fertilisation’, with insights flowing in 
both directions.
In the case of flight, the reason for the broad independence of applied and basic 
research stems from the fact that there are multiple different ways of ‘solving the 
problem’ of flight. Rigid wings with a source of propulsion will do it, but so will 
flappable wings of the right sort. As one of these is biologically more plausible, 
while the other is easier to produce mechanically, the two traditions have taken off 
on distinct paths, leaving little room, or motivation, for collaboration. However, it 
has not typically seemed that this type of situation is present in the case of cognitive 
capacities. In many cases, both applied and basic researchers are in the position of 
asking ‘how-possibly’ questions: how can we identify a 3-D scene on the basis of 
a 2-D retinal projection? how could a mechanical system display rationality in its 
transitions between states? etc. In such a case, the applied and pure theorists are both 
attempting to envision systems capable of performing the task (albeit, often with dif-
ferent constraints), and so the potential for mutual illumination is high. And indeed, 
this is what we see when we look to the shared history of Artificial Intelligence 
and Cognitive Science. On the one hand, cognitive theories provide accounts of how 
various tasks are solved by humans, which themselves can serve as models when 
designing machines capable of solving the same problem. On the other, if a machine 
can be developed to solve a problem, this provides an existence-proof that the algo-
rithms it implements have the capacities we are seeking to explain in humans, and 
thus suggests the hypothesis that this is indeed the way our own minds work.
The domain of language has exemplified this cross-fertilisation as much as any 
other. Early work in generative linguistics, such as Chomsky (1957/2002, 1965) 
(partially developed, relevantly to my current point, while Chomsky was employed 
at MIT to work on a machine translation project) was hugely influential in the early 
development of language processing systems, which until around the 1980s largely 
worked by incorporating the rule systems characterised by such theoretical work. 
In the other direction, the very existence of physical computers has provided the 
dominant framework for theorising about the mind since the latter half of the 20th 
Century: the Computational Theory of Mind.
Further, NLP may seem an even better source for theoretical insight than other 
branches of AI, given that NLP systems are designed to engage with human lan-
guage users. This may provide a constraint on these systems, ensuring that their 
behaviour doesn’t deviate too far from that of humans, which may be absent in other 
Footnote 3 (continued)
the fact that some DL model has solved a linguistic task by forming certain sorts of structures or inferen-
tial patterns to the claim that human language works in a similar or analogous way.
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domains, such as computer vision, or object classification, wherein the computa-
tional systems interact not with other agents, but with the environment.
The view that the most successful engineering projects in the linguistic domain 
could provide insight for our pure science theories of human language thus suggests 
itself very naturally, given the significant successes such a program has generated 
recently. To see how such inferences might go, in the next section I shall describe 
in some more detail how DL models of natural language work, and how we might 
leverage from them theoretical insight.
3  How Do Machines “Learn Languages”?
While there is lots of variation in DL models, depending on the specific task they 
are designed to solve, the resources available, and other factors, the basic functional-
ity of such systems is relatively straightforward. I will focus on supervised, end-to-
end neural network models.
These models consist of a collection of inter-connected nodes. Each node func-
tions to transform an input signal, from each node causally upstream of it in the net-
work, into an output signal, which is transferred to those nodes causally downstream 
of it. These nodes are organised into layers, with each node in a given layer largely 
causally responsive to nodes in the previous layer. The ‘deep’ in ‘deep learning’ 
reflects the fact that these neural networks have many such layers. A major axis of 
variation for such networks is their topology: traditional ‘connectionist’ networks 
were highly connected, with each node in a given layer connected to every node 
in the layers on either side, while modern deep networks are typically much more 
internally heterogeneous. Input nodes comprise the first layer of such a network, and 
receive their inputs exogenously. Such inputs must therefore be ‘encoded’ so as to 
be readable by the system. For example, a machine translation program will take an 
encoded sentence in a given language as input, which will send a wave of activation 
through the network. The properties of this wave will be determined by the indi-
vidual functions of each node. The wave will culminate with the output of the final 
layer, which can then be decoded, for example as a sentence in the target language.
The most important feature of such networks is that the signal transformation 
functions of each node need not be, and usually are not, determined by the program-
mer. Instead, they are ‘learned’, i.e. dynamically modified in response to training. 
Supervised training consists in providing the network with a range of input-output 
pairs, a way of comparing its own outputs, given these inputs, with the ‘correct’ 
pairings provided, and a method for modifying the functions of internal nodes so as 
to better fit these correct pairings. For example, in a machine translation system, we 
could provide a wide range of paired English and French sentences (e.g. from the 
proceedings of Canadian Parliament). If we initially randomise the functions of the 
nodes in this system, its initial outputs will be very unlike the intended translations 
of the input sentences. But by using a learning algorithm, such as backpropagation, 
we can compare the system’s ‘guess’ of the translation with its genuine translation, 
and modify the internal weightings in such a way that they are more likely to pro-
duce the target output. Repeated application of this process enables the system to 
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‘hill-climb’, strengthening the functions which are on the right track, and dampening 
those that lead to mistranslation. Given enough nodes, and enough training data, the 
system will converge on a function capable of generating these data, and if things go 
well, generalising beyond to novel cases. Much engineering work in machine learn-
ing is aimed at ensuring this latter.
Paradigmatic work in NLP uses end-to-end modeling, where the input and output 
are taken as given, and no constraints are placed on how the system calculates the 
function mapping the former onto the latter. For example, Wu et al. (2016) present 
the Google Neural Machine Translation (GNMT) system, which was able to achieve 
results comparable to those “achieved by average bilingual human translators on 
some [...] test sets” (p. 20). This system takes entire sentences in a given language as 
input, mapping these onto output sentences as a whole, rather than identifying and 
translating individual words and phrases and using these to sequentially construct a 
translated sentence.
Now, of course, producing a system capable of performing machine translation 
(or transcribing speech, answering questions, or any other NLP task) does not, on 
its own, provide theoretical insight into natural language. The input-output perfor-
mance of such systems takes us no further than what human translators are capable 
of doing, without detailed knowledge of contemporary linguistics. However, it could 
be hoped that ‘opening up’ such systems, and looking at how they perform these 
tasks might indeed be illuminating in this way. This is the proposal that seems most 
prima facie plausible as a contribution from DL to theoretical linguistics, and is the 
one I shall be investigating.
Before elaborating on my argument that this proposal is mistaken, i.e. that DL 
systems are unlikely to complete linguistic tasks in the way that humans do, and thus 
that we are unlikely to learn about human language through investigation of such 
systems, it will be essential to get clear on just how DL systems could, in princi-
ple, provide theoretical illumination. Specifically, investigation of the classificatory 
schemes adopted by such systems could provide a source of evidence pertinent to 
selecting theories of how human beings classify linguistic expressions. I turn now to 
spelling out such a proposal.
Theoretical linguists often debate about whether two surface linguistic phenom-
ena should be viewed as resulting from distinct underlying operations, or from the 
same operation, as applied in different ways, or to different expressions. For exam-
ple, traditional work in generative linguistics distinguished between two linguis-
tic operations responsible for sentences apparently consisting of a single nominal 
argument serving as subject of multiple verbs. ‘Control’ involves a sentential sub-
ject serving as semantic argument of both a main and an embedded verb, and is 
underlain by a structure in which the subject nominal is grammatically the subject of 
the main verb, with an unpronounced anaphoric expression (denoted ‘PRO’) serv-





to read regularly”. Mikhail here is both the (hopeful) reader and the wanter, and 
this result is achieved by enforcing co-reference between the sentential subject 
and its anaphoric PRO. Raising, on the other hand, involves the sentential subject 
only genuinely being the semantic argument of the embedded verb, but appearing 
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regularly”, wherein Mikhail is the reader, but not the ‘seemer’. Raising structures 
result from moving the embedded subject to sentential subject position, leaving 
behind a trace (or, in most contemporary theories, an unpronounced but identical 
copy). While phonologically, we hear the nominal expression at the beginning of 
the sentence, semantically it is interpreted in its original, embedded location. Argu-
ments that, despite the surface similarity between “Mikhail wants to read regularly” 
and “Mikhail seems to read regularly”, these result from different underlying pro-
cesses appeal to observations like: raising verbs can take semantically null expletive 
subjects, while control verbs can’t (“It seems Mikhail reads regularly” vs. *“It wants 
Mikhail reads regularly”). However, in line with the explanatory scheme of contem-
porary Minimalist grammar, which problematises the introduction of formal tools 
like indices into grammatical structures, Hornstein (1999) argues that we should 
view both kinds of surface structure as stemming from the same sorts of process, 
specifically reducing control to raising.4
Cases like this, where linguists are unsure as to whether some surface phenom-
ena result from distinct or similar underlying operations, provide possible targets for 
DL-based investigation. By investigating the internal workings of an NLP system, 
we could see whether these phenomena are treated in the same, or different, ways by 
such systems. And this could provide a prima facie argument that they are treated 
likewise by our linguistic faculties. Indeed, it could be argued, at a certain level of 
description what the linguist and the DL system are doing is the same: trying to 
abstract the underlying regularities in linguistic data. Given this, it might be surpris-
ing if the two traditions didn’t converge on their linguistic analyses.
There are various methods that have been proposed for the task of looking inside 
the black box of DL systems. Early work by Sanger (1989) and Elman (1990, 1991) 
showed how to use statistical tools like cluster analysis and principle components 
analysis, applied to connectionist systems, to identify the classifications made by 
these systems. Very roughly, the idea is that we can get some understanding of the 
‘reasoning’ behind the system’s overall input-output behaviour by looking at cor-
relations between responses to different stimuli and between antecedents of different 
outputs. If the same or similar patterns of activation at given nodes or locations are 
reliably activated in response to different inputs, this suggests that the system treats 
these inputs as identical or similar. Likewise, if different outputs are produced by 
similar hidden nodes, this provides insight into the similarities the system ascribes 
to these outputs. Further, correlations between nodes in adjacent layers can iden-
tify common internal trajectories, indicating the patterns of inference that the system 
makes. On the basis of these styles of analysis, Sanger and Elman identified ana-
logues of phonological and grammatical classification occurring internal to connec-
tionist systems.5
4 See Boeckx et al. (2010) for a monograph-length elaboration and defense of this proposal.
5 Interestingly, Elman is very explicit in his assumption that such investigation into the internal workings 
of these connectionist systems should contribute to cognitive theories of human linguistic capacities. See 
e.g. Elman (1991) p. 197.
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Of course, the systems used in contemporary commercial NLP software are mas-
sively more complex than such simple connectionist systems. They typically have 
many more nodes, organised into many more layers, are trained on massive corpora, 
and feature elaborately articulated topological structures. This leads to severe diffi-
culties in interpreting the internal working of such systems. Indeed, the ‘opacity’ of 
such systems has recently been emphasised in philosophical discussions of the ethi-
cal implications of the increasing role of algorithms in our social lives. Despite these 
difficulties in ‘scaling up’, there is reason to think that suitable analytic tools will be 
able to shed light on the internal workings of even large DL systems. Work such as 
Paudyal and Wong (2018) is already showing promise in this area.6
So, on the one hand, NLP systems are displaying ever-improving performance on 
standard linguistic tasks, to the point where they are at human or near-human lev-
els. On the other, there is sustained effort dedicated towards identifying the internal 
workings of such systems. Together, these suggest the potential for contribution to 
theoretical cognitive science. If machines can perform the tasks that we can, and we 
can discover how they do so (i.e. which classifications they draw, which transitions 
they make, etc.), this may provide grounds for thinking that we perform these tasks 
in the same way. These machines would provide both an existence-proof that such 
solutions to these tasks are possible, and provide a model we can examine and even 
experiment on without the usual practical and ethical concerns that arise in trying 
to understand the psychology of human subjects. Returning to our earlier example, 
an NLP system trained on a naturalistic corpus containing both control and raising 
verbs could be inspected to see how it classifies such expressions, and the similarity 
or disparity between such classifications could then be leveraged as evidence in the-
oretical debates concerning the similarity of the processes used in generating such 
expressions in human language.
Something along these lines is proposed by several theorists. Norvig (2017) for 
example claims that “examination of the properties” of a “model containing bil-
lions of parameters” can provide “insight” into the workings of human language 
(p. 63). A recent survey of the relevance of DL models to cognitive science has 
claimed that “When deep neural models achieve state of the art performance in tasks 
highly related to human cognition, it is natural to ask what these models can sug-
gest to cognitive science. This question is even more compelling when the task is 
the highest cognitive function of humans: language.” (Perconti and Plebe (2020) p. 
8). This line is then expanded on later in the paper with the claim that DL models 
“[already] process aspects of full-fledged human language” (p. 9). And a popular 
textbook in NLP states that “While practical utility is something different from the 
validity of a theory, the usefulness of statistical [i.e. computational, corpus-based] 
models of language tends to confirm that there is something right about the basic 
6 See Creel (2020) for an overview of this topic, and discussion of some strategies for avoiding ‘opacity’ 
in DL systems, and Prince and Schwarcz (2019) and Johnson (Unpublished Manuscript) for discussion of 
both the ethical need for such analysis, and the difficulties that arise in developing it.
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approach.” (Manning and Schutze (1999) p.4).7 I believe, however, that a core meth-
odological assumption of linguistic theory, the distinction between competence and 
performance, provides principled reason to be sceptical that such insight will be 
forthcoming.
4  Competence and Performance: A Functional Approach
Language, it is often claimed, is sound with meaning. We can update this intuitive 
and traditional proposal so as to better include gestural (and, perhaps, written) lan-
guages: language is perceptible sign with meaning. While issues surrounding mean-
ing are notoriously murky, at least on this proposal the vehicles of these meanings, 
soundwaves, manual gestures, ink marks, etc., seem ontologically unproblematic 
and empirically investigable. A human linguist, or an artificial system, is able to 
examine linguistic tokens, investigate their properties and relations, and generalise 
about them.
The problem is, this proposed definition is incorrect. In line with the assump-
tion that linguistics is a branch of cognitive science, mainstream generative linguis-
tic theory assumes that linguistic expressions are not, strictly speaking, sounds, or 
publicly observable signs, at all. Rather, they are internal, psychological structures. 
Publicly observable signs may result from the generation of such internal structures, 
but only by involving a variety of other psychological processes to ‘translate’ the lat-
ter into the former. Some of these processes will be linguistically specific, but some 
will not, the latter being either specific to something other than language or psycho-
logically general. Relatedly, some of these processes may be quite systematic and 
predictable, but some will not. This is all to say that perceptible signs are complex 
interaction effects, influenced by linguistic structures, but not determined by them. 
Given this, there is no guarantee, indeed it is empirically unlikely and presupposed 
by most linguists to be false, that robust scientific theories or empirically confirmed 
generalisations will apply to such public, perceptible signs.8
Consider a standard psychological model of linguistic production which maps 
a thought onto an utterance.9 On standard assumptions, such a process requires: 
identification of relevant lexical items, morphological combination and transforma-
tion of these items to form words10, grammatical composition of these words into a 
7 All of these proposals are more modest, and much more plausible, than the claim made in some popu-
lar, public-facing, discussions (e.g. Anderson (2008)) that DL models can not merely supplement, but 
replace theoretical science.
8 This is in fact one of the major objections to Devitt’s nominalist approach to linguistics: many of the 
central theoretical posits of linguistic theory seem to be essentially properties of psychological represen-
tations, not of public symbols. See e.g. Collins (2008).
9 For simplicity, I am assuming that the thought is generated prior to linguistic processing, but this is 
not a requirement. See Dupre (2020) for discussion of the idea that the generation of a thought just is the 
generation of a linguistic structure.
10 It is controversial whether this is a component of grammatical structure-building or a distinct process. 




hierarchical syntactic structure, and phonological processing, sensitive to all three 
prior processes, generating a linearised structure suitable for use by the articulatory 
systems. However, even this structure is itself not a public, observable sign, but a 
psychological representation. Specific systems of speech production, as well as gen-
eral mechanisms of motor control, modulated by various aspects of the speaker’s 
mind including their communicative intentions, knowledge about their audience, 
etc., must be recruited to produce anything perceptible. On the basis of this public 
sign, similar, but (modulo peripheral differences) reversed, processes in the hearer 
can, if all goes well, recreate the internal (syntactic, morphological, phonological, 
semantic) representations that in the speaker caused such a production.
Some of these processes are the targets of linguistic theorising. Others, however, 
are not. For example, in my dialect both  , with a final alveolar stop, and 
 ending on a glottal stop, are legitimate ways of pronouncing ‘cat’. There are 
systematic rules of phonology which ensure this. However, which of these licensed 
options I opt for in a given conversational context will depend on a wide range of 
non-linguistic, and more-or-less unsystematic factors, including who I am speaking 
to, how formal the situation is, how fast I am speaking etc. Even taking these into 
account, however, there is probably some residual variability. Further, if I am imitat-
ing a friend’s accent, or eating, or drunk, my utterances of ‘cat’ may not resemble 
either of these. This variation in mapping stable, internal representations onto per-
ceptible utterances is simply outside of the scope of linguistic theory.
All of this is simply to say that linguistics is a theory of competence, the under-
lying rule-system(s) partially responsible for the acquisition and use of language, 
whereas sounds, and any other perceptible signs, are instances of performance, 
actual linguistic behaviour.11 Components of competence are causal influences on 
performance, but do not determine it. Performance thus provides evidence for a the-
ory of competence, but not its subject matter.
Consider, in this light, a language model. A language model can take as input 
a linguistic string, and produce its best guess of a plausible continuation. Upon its 
recent unveiling, GPT-3, the Generative Pre-trained Transformer 3, a deep neural 
network language model of this sort, received international media coverage, due to 
its often uncanny ability to engage in conversation with humans and complete vari-
ous kinds of linguistic tasks in human-like ways. Such a system is, obviously, aimed 
at reproducing human performance. One of its central goals, then, is to learn, on 
the basis of massive amounts of corpus-data, which utterances (in this case, inscrip-
tions, not sounds) are acceptable and which are not. That is, it must learn a function 
capable of generating the (presumably infinite) set of acceptable English strings, on 
the basis of its lexical inventory.12 Call this set ‘P’, and call a function generating it 
11 ‘Competence’ here is being used in the technical sense introduced to linguistic theory by Chomsky 
(1965). This differs from other uses, such as Miracchi (2019)’s, for which a ‘competence’ is a reliable, 
agential behavioural capacity, not an underlying representational system which may or may not explain 
such a capacity.
12 Even this is something of an idealisation. Being able to convincingly engage with human speakers 
need not involve being able to generate all acceptable English utterances. Many acceptable utterances 
would rarely if ever come up in conversation, e.g. the semantically bizarre or trivial, and so a failure to 
treat such utterances as legitimate may not undermine the performance of a language model.
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‘fPerf  ’. Let’s even assume, idealising a bit, that fPerf  is indeed acquired by GPT-3, so 
that it never produces unacceptable utterances, and, given the right sort of stimulus, 
could in principle produce any acceptable utterance.
Identifying fPerf  is no small feat. It will require not merely correctly classifying 
the data it is trained on, but accurately extrapolating from this to any arbitrary mem-
ber of ‘P’, in the manner of ‘zero-shot learning’ exemplified by GPT-3. Systems 
capable of this are able to correctly classify novel stimuli as members of categories 
not found in their training data. However, even learning capable of supporting such 
zero-shot classification subserves performance, and as we shall see there is no rea-
son to think that the best system for reproducing performance is likely to closely 
match the systems actually used by human speakers.
As the discussion of this section has aimed to show, the goal of theoretical lin-
guistics is not to identify fPerf  . The closest thing to P in theoretical linguistics is the 
set of legitimate linguistic structures. Call this set ‘C’. TL, then, is interested in iden-
tifying the function capable of generating C, call this ‘ fComp’.13,14 fComp will then be 
a function from the basic constituents of language (i.e. morphemes) to the complex 
structures generated to serve at the interface between language and other cognitive 
systems, centrally semantic interpretation and motor control.
As we’ve seen, capturing fPerf  is likely the best case scenario for NLP. On the 
one hand, the engineering goals of this program are behaviourally defined. It doesn’t 
matter to Google whether automated question-answerers, translators, text summa-
risers, etc. follow the same morpho-syntactic rules as humans, what matters is that 
their outputs are sufficiently similar to ours. On the other, DL systems require train-
ing data, and lots of it. But data, by its very nature, is observable. fComp maps unob-
servable representations onto unobservable representations, and so doesn’t produce 
anything a system could be trained on, and thus there is no way for an DL system to 
learn it directly.
5  The Distance Between Competence and Performance
The question, then, is: is there reason to think that learning fPerf  will shed light on 
the function fComp that theoretical linguists are interested in.
Ultimately, this question boils down to a question of the distance between com-
petence C and performance P. A fairly common assumption in both theoretical lin-
guistics and NLP is that this distance is fairly minimal. Performance, on this view is 
competence plus some noise. Another way to put this is to say that one can largely 
abstract away from whatever extra-linguistic mechanisms are used in language 
13 Note that, whereas NLP is aimed at identifying any function capable of generating P, TL is aimed at 
identifying the specific function that actually generates C for human speakers. Another way to put this is 
to say that NLP aims at identifying fPerf  , understood as a function-in-extension, whereas TL is aimed at 
identifying fComp as a function-in-intension.
14 Note also that fComp is itself an abstraction from the various more specific functions that will be the 
target of linguistic sub-disciplines: morphologists aim to uncover the function from morphemes to words, 
syntacticians the function from words to phrases, etc.
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production/perception without missing out on much. If performance is a fairly 
direct reflection of competence, plus or minus a bit, identifying fPerf  might be highly 
informative for the theoretical linguist. And indeed, many paradigmatic cases of per-
formance deviating from competence do seem to be ‘noisy’: people umm and ahh, 
repeat words, and revise sentences midway through, they mumble their words due 
to inattention, inebriation, a mouth full of peanut butter, etc. Even more system-
atic cases, such as memory constraints precluding very long or complex sentences, 
don’t seem like they would pose a deep worry for NLP systems, capable as they 
are of extrapolating from the simple cases they encounter. And many NLP systems, 
especially convolutional neural nets, are often praised precisely for their ability to 
abstract away from noise in the stimulus.15
However, it is an empirical assumption that performance relates to competence 
in this fairly tidy way. There are multiple ways that it could turn out to be false. 
For one, ‘performance effects’ need not simply consist in adding noise to the signal 
of competence. It is perfectly possible that performance systems could add signal 
of their own. That is, non-language-specific psychological systems could contribute 
information to utterances that doesn’t correspond to any aspect of linguistic struc-
ture. Some kinds of utterance, such as interjections or greetings, are plausibly of this 
sort. ‘Hello’, ‘ouch’, ‘hey’, etc. do not combine with other linguistic expressions in 
grammatical ways, and so may be genuinely para-linguistic. And there is no reason 
in principle why we couldn’t learn whole phrases like this.16 Our utterances of such 
phrases would then be more akin to the production of a drawing or a diagram, a 
product of general intelligence rather than language-specific systems, but this fact 
would not make itself apparent in the public sign itself.
Another possibility is that the process of uttering (‘externalising’) an expression 
produces something with very different properties, altering, destroying, or adding 
features in ways that preclude any ‘backwards path’. If the externalisation of a lin-
guistic structure involves these complex transformations, even if they are highly 
systematic, there is no reason to expect that a DL system trained on these outputs 
will be able to recreate the original structures. The point is not merely that multiple 
distinct processes can produce the same outputs (although this is of course true and 
important). Rather, it is that the underlying structures may be far from the simplest 
ways of generating the observed output, and thus the observed behaviour may be 
uninformative of the processes and rules used in its generation. Of course, although 
the set P does not logically determine that a specific function generated it, if there 
15 Additionally, it may work in NLP’s favour that they are often trained on written languages, which 
typically conform more closely to stable conventions than spoken language. On the other hand, much 
work in NLP involves training systems on language use in online contexts which may bring with it vari-
ous internet-specific deviations from linguistic rules.
16 Note that my view that we can learn complex linguistic expressions as memorized tokens is a far cry 
from the proposal made by construction grammarians (e.g. Goldberg (2006) and Tomasello (2003)) that 
this is all that learning a language amounts to. While I believe that we should retains the ‘rules and repre-
sentations’ approach of mainstream generative grammar, I believe that our linguistic behaviour need not 
exclusively stem from such rule-governed processes and is likely instead ‘supplemented’ by something 
more akin to the acquisition and deployment of constructions.
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were a simple relationship between C and P, then a system aimed at identifying fPerf  
might identify fComp as a likely underlying process. However, if C and P are related 
only in complex and unpredictable ways, discovering fPerf  may tell us very little 
about the target of interest, fComp.17
It is only the assumption that the contribution of the processes involved in exter-
nalising, i.e. in mapping C onto P, are either unsystematic (noisy) or uninteresting 
(simple), that allows us to infer from performance to competence. I believe that a 
strong empirical case can be made that these externalising processes cannot be ide-
alised away. That is, in both of the manners just described, performance deviates 
from competence in substantial ways.
Firstly, it is plausible that a wide range of perfectly ordinary utterances are best 
viewed as conventional productive idioms, incorporated into speakers’ linguistic 
repertoires wholesale, rather than generated by one’s language faculty. The cases 
will vary from language to language, but examples of this in English plausibly 
include: echo-questions [1], pied-piping [2], non-constituent conjunction [3], and 
subject-dropping [4]: 
1. Alejandro said what?
2. To whom shall I address the letter?
3. Holmes knows, while Watson merely suspects, that the butler did it.
4. Saw Marcel at the shops earlier. Seems well.
Each of these, in one way or another, poses problems for grammatical theory. Of 
course, this is not to say that grammatical theories which allow for 1-4 are impos-
sible. But they are more complex, in ways that put significant pressure on develop-
mental and evolutionary theories of language.18 For this reason, it is often better to 
treat utterances of these types as outside of the domain of grammatical theory, as 
‘learned exceptions’ to the rules governing our grammars.19 To the extent that this is 
correct, DL systems trained on naturalistic data are liable to identify linguistic pat-
terns which don’t correspond to the underlying grammatical rules.
The second kind of deviation is plausibly widespread as well. Debates rage on 
about the extent to which the hierarchical structure of grammatical representations 
can be extracted from linearised performance data (see Linzen et al. (2016) for rel-
atively recent empirical results), but much of this literature undersells how much 
information is lost in the process of externalising. Mainstream generative theory 
18 See Dupre (2020), Guasti and Cardinaletti (2003), for cases 1 and 2 respectively.
19 The ‘learned exceptions’ I discuss here are unlike what are typically called ‘idioms’ in the generative 
literature (see e.g. Gehrke and McNally (2019)). The cases above are syntactically unexpected, on stand-
ard grammatical assumptions. But semantically, they are quite predictable. What Gehrke and McNally 
call idioms are the opposite kind of case. “Andreas kicked the bucket” is syntactically unexceptional, but 
its typical intended meaning is unpredictable without particular knowledge of the idiom in question. I 
leave open whether these ‘semantic’ idioms will pose similar problems for inferring facts about human 
language from DL systems trained on linguistic corpora.
17 This point is thus the inverse of Firestone (2020)’s point that the failure of a machine to display 
human performance may tell us little about whether such a machine shares human competence.
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adopts the ‘copy theory’ of movement, according to which argument expressions 
are typically (perhaps invariably) found at multiple locations in a sentential struc-
ture. Most familiarly, when a sentential subject is also the object of a relative clause, 
as in “The team that the millionaire bought lost”, standard theories claim that the 
underlying syntactic structure contains two tokens of the noun phrase ‘the team’, 
one in each place it receives semantic interpretation (i.e. the structure is closer to: 
“[The team
1
 [that the millionaire bought the team
1
 ] lost]”). Contemporary genera-
tive theory suggests such displacement is much more widely found than has previ-
ously been assumed. For example, the ‘VP-Internal Subject Hypothesis’ (Koopman 
& Sportiche, 1991) has it that every sentential subject undergoes movement from its 
original position as the specifier of a VP towards the ‘left-periphery’ of the sentence 
where it is pronounced. Facts of this nature are obviously not made evident by the 
produced utterance, and so are unlikely to be uncovered by any DL system trained 
on corpus data. Similar kinds of worries can be raised on the basis of programs like 
distributed morphology (Embick, 2015), which argue that the words that seem, at 
the surface, to be the units of language are in fact complex products of a variety of 
underlying processes. Again, such complexity will be, from the perspective of any 
DL system trained on performance, invisible.
Note that the import of these phenomena is not that it is impossible that DL sys-
tems could, on the basis of such data, extract a complex of linguistic rules that cor-
respond to the rules governing human language. It is just that there is no particular 
reason to expect this. The relation between internal structure, which theoretical lin-
guists care about, and utterances is highly complex, likely more complex than some 
systems which simply generate these surface forms directly. As the theoretical goals 
of NLP turn not on identifying this complex underlying system, but just on generat-
ing these surface forms, there is no expectation, or requirement, that NLP systems 
will point towards the targets of theoretical linguistics.
A common thought is that, given that human beings learn their languages from 
their linguistic environments, it must be possible for a machine to do so as well. And 
indeed, given that a human is capable of acquiring a given language on the basis 
of exposure to a finite set of utterances, there must be some way a machine could 
be designed such that if we were to provide this set of utterances as input, it would 
develop in ways that would allow us to ‘read off’ human linguistic competence from 
its internal organization. The question is: how likely is it that such a machine would 
be constructed given the engineering goals of NLP? What I hope to have shown is 
that this is highly unlikely. On the one hand, if the generative tradition I am appeal-
ing to is on the right track, human abilities to acquire a language depend in large 
part on linguistically-specific innate structures. The aim of this discipline is to iden-
tify these structures, and whatever modifications the process of language acquisition 
produce in them. This is made difficult by the fact that much of the empirical data 
for linguistic theories is unreflective or only partially reflective of such structures, 
being explained instead by a wide variety of extra-linguistic psychological systems. 
On the other hand, the engineering project of NLP centrally relies on the use of gen-
eral (i.e. not language specific) learning mechanisms, aimed at reproducing observ-
able data. It is thus far from obvious why we should expect the end products of these 
quite different projects, TL and DL, to converge. Of course, an NLP designer could 
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wait for the completion of a TL theory of natural language, and incorporate such 
results into a DL system, but this would obviously not provide any insight for TL, 
and would be unlikely to further the practical goals of DL.
These empirical issues point to a deeper, methodological, reason why we 
shouldn’t expect NLP and theoretical linguistics to converge on linguistic systems. 
Contrary to empiricist accounts of science, science is not aimed at predicting obser-
vations, but about using observations as cues to underlying reality.20 A linguist, then, 
in developing her theories, is not aiming to predict performance, but to describe 
underlying competence. In performing this latter task, she may draw on a wide range 
of evidence. If a description of a linguistic phenomenon is found in one language, 
but is unlike that found in any other, this can be reason to reject this description. If 
neurobiological evidence suggests speakers treat two linguistic phenomena differ-
ently, this can be used to argue against proposals that they are the same. If a pur-
ported linguistic rule cannot be learned from environmental data, it must be innate, 
and if it is innate, it must be explained developmentally and/or evolutionarily, which 
brings with it substantive constraints. If children learning their native language, or 
adults learning a second language, reliably make mistakes of a particular sort, this 
may indicate that there are internal biases towards languages with a feature which 
explains this. And so on. None of these sources of data are available, or pertinent, 
to the task of NLP systems trying to extract regularities from linguistic corpora. 
Thus, NLP systems will be relevant to theoretical linguistics to the extent that these 
sources of evidence are irrelevant to the latter. Most work in theoretical linguistics 
indicates that this will not get us very far.
This last point shows us that the worry is not merely one of underdetermination of 
theory by evidence. That is, it is not merely that, given that competence falls short of 
determining performance, extrapolating from performance (as DL systems do) will 
not necessarily tell us about one determinant of performance, namely competence. 
This is true, but weak. The stronger point is that there are substantial reasons, empir-
ical and methodological, to think NLP will, and indeed should, identify patterns and 
rules quite unlike those proposed by theoretical linguists. To the extent that NLP 
remains an engineering discipline, then, aimed at reproducing performance, it is 
unlikely to be of use to theorists of competence. Of course, one could look for ways 
to incorporate these kinds of constraints (neuro-biological and evolutionary plau-
sibility, compatibility with results from first and second language acquisition, etc.) 
into a DL system. In doing so, however, one would deliberately be moving away 
from the engineering goals of NLP.
While I find the empirical arguments for a significant distance between compe-
tence and performance compelling, it is worth noting that they are highly controver-
sial. In particular, this feature of linguistic theorizing is particularly prominent within 
mainstream generative grammar, as exemplified by the Minimalist Program (Chom-
sky, 1995). A variety of other linguistic approaches are, in the terms of Sag and 
Wasow (2011), much more “surface-oriented”. That is, these approaches, such as 
Head-Driven Phrase Structure Grammar (Pollard & Sag, 1994), Lexical-Functional 
20 See Dupre (Forthcoming) for an argument along these lines.
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Grammar (Kaplan et al., 1981), Simpler Syntax (Culicover & Jackendoff, 2005), and 
Construction Grammar (Goldberg (2006) and Tomasello (2003)), insist on much 
stricter correspondence between the structure licensed by a given linguistic theory 
and observable properties of linguistic utterances. The arguments for this are largely 
methodological, rather than empirical: linguistic theory is on better evidential foot-
ing when it aims to capture all or most observable aspects of language, rather than 
just that, perhaps small, subset of observable linguistic behaviour reflective of a pur-
ported causally distant competence. While I hope that some of the discussion above 
has pointed to why such arguments are mistaken, the goal here is of course not to 
argue for one linguistic theory over another.
It is worth noting, however, that even those theorists who defend such ‘surface-
oriented’ approaches to language tend to endorse some version of the competence-
performance distinction. Christiansen and Chater (2016) say that “Language, like 
any other empirical phenomenon, is the product of many factors, and explaining lan-
guage requires separating the influence of these different factors.” (p.234). Jackend-
off (2002) (p. 34) argues for a ‘soft’, ‘methodological’ interpretation of this distinc-
tion. And even Michael Tomasello (2000), who elsewhere (Ibbotson & Tomasello, 
2016) claims that such a distinction makes a grammatical theory immune to falsi-
fication by observation, recognizes the empirical need to disentangle the effects of 
performance constraints from the contributions of competence in explaining linguis-
tic behaviour. This is for good reason. It is a truism that people’s speech behaviour 
need not correspond to their knowledge of the rules of language, given the ubiquity 
of disfluencies, false starts, etc. in conversation. The question then is just how wide 
this gap is. While I am willing to bet, with mainstream generative linguistics, that 
the gap is quite substantial, for the purposes of this paper, I am happy with the con-
ditional conclusion: to the extent that mainstream generative proposals are on the 
right track, and competence and performance may bear only faint resemblance to 
one another, DL models are unlikely to provide insight concerning the nature of lin-
guistic competence.
To reiterate a point from earlier, the gap I have argued for between competence 
and performance does not show us that NLP will be totally irrelevant to linguistics 
generally. In particular, it is plausible that, once linguistic competence is described, 
computational models could be used to test how much of this could be learned from 
the child’s linguistic environment.21 This would be very significant in apportioning 
linguistic knowledge between the innate and the learned. What I hope to have shown 
is that the prior task of identifying the structure of competence itself is unlikely to 
be advanced by examining the computational models utilised in NLP.
21 Although there are difficulties here, too, as machines typically require significantly more data than 
child learners, thus making inferences from their abilities to ours uncertain.
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6  Conclusion
Quine (1960) (p. 8) compared language users to topiary elephants. While the 
external shapes may be identical, they are made so by quite different internal 
structures. Decades of work in generative linguistics seems to show that this anal-
ogy is empirically mistaken in the case of human language, for which the univer-
sal, internal constraints seem to vastly outstrip the role of experience in ensuring 
similarity between speakers. But it seems entirely appropriate when comparing 
human and machine learners. Powerful DL systems may be capable of reproduc-
ing the observable shapes of human language. And, of course, this should be 
viewed as a significant success from an engineering perspective. But, if the gen-
erative tradition is on the right track, they are likely to do so only with radically 
different internal properties, and so are unlikely to be theoretically illuminating.
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